I. INTRODUCTION

The world is once again experiencing a major financial-economic crisis, the worst since the crash of October 1929 that initiated the great depression of the 1930s. Many citizens are concerned for obvious reasons; we are facing global recession; banks and financial institutions go bankrupt; companies struggle to get credit and many are forced to reduce their workforce or even go out of business. Interest rates are increasing while private savings invested in the stock market evaporate. Large parts of our contemporary societies are changing in a more correlated manner than in case the stock index is ascending. A thorough statistical analysis of the data shows that the observed difference is significant, suggesting a constant fear factor among stockholders.

Empirical evidence is given for a significant difference in the collective trend of the share prices during the stock index rising and falling periods. Data on the Dow Jones Industrial Average and its stock components are studied between 1991 and 2008. Pearson-type correlations are computed between the stocks and averaged over stock pairs and time. The results indicate a general trend: whenever the stock index is falling the stock prices are changing in a more correlated manner than in case the stock index is ascending. A thorough statistical analysis of the data shows that the observed difference is significant, suggesting a constant fear factor among stockholders.

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There is certainly the aspect of market microstructure whenever we examine the collective behavior of stock market participants. Ever since the stock market crash of 1987, programmed trading has many times been cited as a possible factor behind the acceleration of downward movements during a market crash. Certainly the advancement of these algorithmic trading platforms contributes to increasing correlation between stock movements but we believe that these algorithms produce symmetric correlations and cannot account for the asymmetry documented in the present paper.

II. INVERSE STATISTICS

Distribution of returns is traditionally used as one of the proxies for the performance of stocks and markets over a certain time history. In the economics, finance, and econometrics literature the problem of market sentiment and investor confidence is usually addressed by the use of various indicators. These indicators are either derived from objective market data, or obtained by conducting questionnaire-based surveys among professional and individual investors. In the present study we consider thus the first approach, since we believe that the market data (prices and returns) are more objective proxies than questionnaire-inferred data.

The basic quantity of interest is the logarithmic return, defined as the (natural) logarithm of the relative price change over a fixed time interval \( \Delta t \), i.e.,

\[
 r_{\Delta t}(t) = \ln \left( \frac{p(t + \Delta t)}{p(t)} \right),
\]

where \( p(t) \) denotes the asset price at time \( t \). In addition to this basic quantity, it is also desirable to have available a...
time-dependent proxy where the asset performance is gauged over a nonconstant time interval. One such approach is the so-called inverse statistics approach \cite{PhysRevE.63.066113,PhysRevLett.95.038701,PhysRevE.66.026134,PhysRevLett.99.018701} recently introduced and adapted to finance from the study of turbulence \cite{PhysRevE.67.046109,PhysRevLett.97.018701}. The main idea underlying this method is to not fix the time interval (or window), $\Delta t$ in Eq. (1), but instead to turn the question around and ask for what is the (shortest) waiting time, $\tau_p$, needed to reach a given (fixed) return level, $p$, for the first time when the initial investment was made at time $t$ [see Ref. \cite{PhysRevE.63.066113} for details].

$$p \leq r_p(t).$$

Hence, the inverse statistics approach concerns itself with the study of the distribution of waiting times [13] that in the following will be denoted by $p(\tau_p)$.

Recently, this method of analysis has been applied to the study of various single stocks and market indices, both from mature and emerging markets, as well as to foreign exchange data and even artificial markets \cite{PhysRevE.63.066113,PhysRevLett.95.038701,PhysRevE.66.026134,PhysRevLett.99.018701,PhysRevLett.95.018701,PhysRevLett.97.018701,PhysRevE.67.046109,PhysRevLett.97.018701,PhysRevE.69.026121,PhysRevE.69.026115}. The waiting time histograms possess well-defined and pronounced ($p$-dependent) maxima [7] [Fig. 1(a)] followed by tails that have been claimed to have a power-law decay $p(\tau_p) \sim \tau_p^{-\alpha}$ \cite{PhysRevE.63.066113,PhysRevLett.95.038701,PhysRevE.66.026134,PhysRevLett.99.018701,PhysRevLett.95.018701,PhysRevLett.97.018701,PhysRevE.67.046109,PhysRevLett.97.018701,PhysRevE.69.026121,PhysRevE.69.026115}. Although it is not the purpose of the present paper to prove or disprove this statement, our results suggest an exponent $\alpha \approx 3/2$ [Fig. 1(b)], a value that is a consequence of the uncorrelated increments of the underlying asset price process [13]. However, to rigorously prove the power-law assumption, a detailed analysis would be necessary, and it can be done, for instance, by following the method proposed in Ref. \cite{PhysRevE.76.056107}.

Studies of single stocks, for given (moderate) positive and negative levels of returns, $\pm|\rho|$, have revealed, almost symmetric waiting time distributions [Fig. 2] \cite{PhysRevE.69.026121,PhysRevE.69.026115}. Unexpectedly, however, stock index data seem not to share this feature. They do instead give rise to asymmetric waiting time distributions [Fig. 1(a)] for negative levels $|\rho|$ for which the corresponding single stock distributions were symmetric \cite{PhysRevE.69.026121,PhysRevE.69.026115}. This asymmetry is expressed by negative return levels being reached sooner than those corresponding to positive levels (of the same magnitude of $\rho$). This effect was termed the gain-loss asymmetry [7] and has later been observed for many major stock indices \cite{PhysRevE.69.026121,PhysRevE.69.026115,PhysRevE.69.026119,PhysRevE.69.026120,PhysRevE.69.026113,PhysRevE.69.026115}. It is here important to note that the gain-loss asymmetry is not a consequence of the generally long-term positive trend (or drift) of the data since this was removed by considering an average with a suitable window size on the prices. The long-term positive trend will affect long waiting times and would induce shorter waiting times for the positive return levels.

However, empirically one finds that the waiting times of indices are shortest for negative return levels—the opposite of what is to be expected from the long term trend effect. In passing we note that recently it has been found that also single stocks may show some degree of gain-loss asymmetry when the level of return, $|\rho|$, is getting sufficiently large \cite{PhysRevE.69.026113,PhysRevE.69.026115}. However, it still remains true that for not too large return levels, e.g., $|\rho|=0.05$, the waiting time distributions for

**FIG. 1.** (Color online) Inverse statistics results for logarithmic return levels of $\rho=\pm5\%$ for the DJIA index (data between 1991 and 2008). The figures show the gain-loss asymmetry; open green triangles represents $\rho>0$, while filled red circles refer to $\rho<0$. On the log-linear scale (a) the asymmetry is more evident, while on log-log scale (b) the power-law nature of the tail of the distribution is observable. The dashed line indicates the slope $-3/2$.

**FIG. 2.** (Color online) Same as Fig. 1, but now for the DJIA stocks: (a) General Motors and (b) McDonald’s Corp. Notice that gain-loss asymmetry is not observed in this case.
single stocks are symmetric to a good approximation [21].

The presence of a gain-loss asymmetry in an index may seem like a paradox since the value of a stock index is essentially the (weighted) average of the individual constituting stocks. Even so, one does observe an asymmetric waiting time distribution for the index comprised of (more-or-less) symmetric single stocks. How can this be rationalized? Recently, a minimal (toy) model—termed the fear factor model—was constructed for the purpose of explaining this apparent paradox [23]. The key ingredient of this model is the so-called collective fear factor, a concept similar to synchronization [27]. At certain times, controlled by a “fear factor,” the stocks of the model all move downward, while at other times they move independently of each other. This is done in a way that the price processes of the single stocks are (over a long time period) guaranteed to produce symmetric waiting time distributions (and uncorrelated price increments). The fear-factor model, that qualitatively reproduces well empirical findings, introduces collective downward movements among the constituting stocks. The model synchronizes downward stock moves, or in other words, it has stronger stock-stock correlations during dropping markets than during market rises. This means that the fear factor of the stockholders is stronger than their optimism factor on average. This is consistent with the findings of Kahneman and Tversky [28], reported in the economics literature, that demonstrate that the utility loss of negative returns is larger than the utility gain for positive returns in the case of most investors.

Recently, the idea of the fear-factor model [23] was reconsidered and generalized by Siven et al. [25] by allowing for longer time periods of stock comovement (correlations). These authors also show that the gain-loss asymmetry is a long time scale phenomena [25], and that it is related to some correlation properties present in the time series [21]. It was also proposed that the gain-loss asymmetry is in close relationship with the asymmetric volatility models (exponential generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity) used by econometricians [29].

Furthermore, also additional explanations for the gain-loss asymmetry have been proposed in the literature. Those include the leverage effect [2,30–32], and regime switching models [26]. Bouchaud et al. [30] emphasize different behaviors at the level of individual stocks and at the market index level (the weak and strong leverage effect), difference attributed to a certain “panic effect.” This model uses a retarded volatility specification, which breaks down at the index level, because according to the authors, “a specific risk aversion phenomenon seems to be responsible for the enhanced observed negative correlation between volatility and returns.” Ciliberti et al. [33] further developed this model by examining the implications of volatility leverage for option trading strategies and also identifying a relationship between the magnitude of the leverage effect and the size (market capitalization) of stocks. So far, it is fair to say that the origin of the gain-loss asymmetry is still (partly) debated in the literature. A recent article by Lisa Borlund [34] demonstrates, among other things, the stronger stock cross-correlations in times of “panic.” This paper examines the relationship between the second (variance or volatility) and fourth moments (kurtosis) of the distribution of returns. An interesting finding is that there is an inverse relationship between volatility (variance) and kurtosis, a finding explained by the conjecture that in times of panic, although volatility is higher than in normal times, it is more uniform, affecting simultaneously all stocks. However, the author uses a correlation measure, which we find less informative, since it uses only the number of stocks rising and falling and not how much they change. We believe that in order to obtain a truly reliable correlation measure, one has to include effects of the magnitude of price changes, and this can be attained through statistical measures such as the Pearson correlation coefficient.

The key idea of the fear factor model [21,23] is the enhanced stock-stock correlations during periods of falling market. Up to now this idea has not been supported by empirical data. In this work, we conduct such a delicate statistical analysis, and we are able to show, based on empirical data, that indeed there exist a stronger stock-stock correlations during falling, as compared to rising, market.

### III. CONDITIONAL MARKET COMPONENT CORRELATION FUNCTION

Let $r_{\Delta}(t)$ denote the logarithmic return of stock $x$ (from the index under study) between time $t$ and $t+\Delta t$ (the time unit in the DJIA data is $\Delta t=1$ trading day). In order to facilitate the coming discussion, we introduce the following notation for a mathematical average taken over a set $A = \{A(t)\}_{t \in t_{1}^{t_{2}}}$:

$$\langle A(t) \rangle_{t_{1}^{t_{2}}} = \frac{1}{t_{2} - t_{1}} \sum_{t} A(t),$$

where $|A|$ denotes the cardinality of the set, i.e., the number of elements in $A$. If no explicit limits are given for the average [like in $\langle A(t) \rangle_{t} = \langle A(t) \rangle_{t_{1}^{t}}$], all possible values will be assumed for $t$. In terms of this notation, a Pearson-type correlation can then be computed between each stock pair $(x,y)$ resulting in the following (equal time) stock-stock correlation function,

$$S_{(x,y)}(t; \Delta t, \delta t) = \frac{\langle r_{\Delta}(t)^{x} r_{\Delta}(t)^{y} \rangle_{t'=t+\Delta t} - \langle r_{\Delta}(t)^{x} \rangle_{t'=t+\Delta t} \langle r_{\Delta}(t)^{y} \rangle_{t'=t+\Delta t}}{\sigma_{\Delta}^{x}(t; \delta t) \sigma_{\Delta}^{y}(t; \delta t)},$$

where $\sigma_{\Delta}^{x}(t; \delta t)$ is the conditional volatility of stock $x$ at time $t$ and horizon $\Delta t$. This formulation allows for a more flexible definition of the correlation function, which can be adjusted to different market conditions and stock characteristics.

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**Note:** The above text is a natural representation of the document content, focusing on the key points and avoiding excessive technical jargon for clarity. The equations and formulas have been transcribed accurately to maintain fidelity to the original document.
where $\sigma^2_{\alpha}(t; \Delta t)$ signifies the volatility of stock $\alpha (\alpha=x, y)$ at time $t$ (and time window $\Delta t$), and is defined as

$$\sigma^2_{\alpha}(t; \Delta t) = \sqrt{\langle [r^2_{\alpha}(t')]^2 \rangle_{t'=0, t'+\Delta t} - \langle r^2_{\alpha}(t') \rangle^2_{t'=0, t'+\Delta t}}. \tag{5}$$

Note that $S_{x,y}(t, \Delta t; \Delta t)$ contains two time scales; $\Delta t$ is the time window over which the average in Eq. (4) is calculated, while $\Delta t$ is the time interval used to define returns [cf. Eq. (1)].

By definition, the stock-stock correlation function, $S_{x,y}(t, \Delta t; \Delta t)$, is specific to the asset pair $(x, y)$, and does therefore not represent the market as a whole. However, in order to obtain a representative level of stock-stock correlation for the market (index), we propose to average $S_{x,y}(t, \Delta t; \Delta t)$ over all possible stock pairs $(x, y)$ contained in the index. In this way, we are led to introducing the market component correlation function,

$$S_0(t, \Delta t; \Delta t) = \langle S_{x,y}(t, \Delta t; \Delta t) \rangle_{x,y} \tag{6}$$

In passing, we note that the average contained in Eq. (6) potentially should be weighted so that the contribution to the correlation function $S_0(t, \Delta t; \Delta t)$ from a stock pair $(x, y)$ is weighted with a factor that is proportional to the product of the weights associated with the two stocks and used to construct the value of the index. Typically this weight corresponds to the capitalization of the company in question. Since we here, however, are studying the DJIA—for which all constituting stocks have the same weight in the index (an atypical situation)—this possibility has not been considered here and neither has the weight factor been included in the definition of $S_0(t, \Delta t; \Delta t)$.

The market component correlation function, as defined by Eq. (6), measures the overall level of stock-stock correlations of the index (market) under investigation independent of rising and falling market. However, we have set out to study, is if there exists any significant difference between these two latter cases. To this end, we introduce what we below will refer to as the conditional market component correlation function, $C_0(\rho, \Delta t)$, that measures the typical value of the market component correlations $S_0(t, \Delta t; \Delta t)$ given that the (logarithmic) return of the index itself, $r_0(t)$ is above (below) a given return threshold value $\rho$. Mathematically, the conditional market component correlation function is defined by the following conditional time average:

$$C_0(\rho, \Delta t) = \langle \langle C(\rho, t, \Delta t) \rangle_t \rangle_{t}, \tag{7a}$$

where a time-dependent conditional market component correlation function set has been introduced as

$$\langle C(\rho, t, \Delta t) \rangle_t = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \langle S_0(t, \Delta t; \Delta t) \rangle_{r_0(t) \geq \rho} & \text{if } \rho \geq 0 \\ \langle S_0(t, \Delta t; \Delta t) \rangle_{r_0(t) < \rho} & \text{if } \rho < 0 \end{array} \right.. \tag{7b}$$

A comparison of $C_0(+|\rho|, \Delta t; \Delta t)$ and $C_0(-|\rho|, \Delta t; \Delta t)$, should in principle be able to reveal potential difference in the level of stock-stock correlations during periods of rising and falling market conditions. If it is found that $C_0(\rho, \Delta t)$ is symmetric with respect to the sign of $\rho$, the stock-stock correlations do not depend (very much) on the direction of the market. On the other hand, if an asymmetry is observed in $C_0(\pm|\rho|, \Delta t; \Delta t)$ for a given $|\rho|$, this clearly indicates that stock-stock correlations are dependent on market direction. Such results, being interesting in its own right, can practically be used in risk and portfolio management. Moreover, they can be used as valuable input for developing more sophisticated portfolio theories aiming at designing the optimal portfolio. The weights of securities in an optimal portfolio as modeled by Markowitz [35] depend on the correlations and covariance matrices between the returns of those securities and these correlations assume a uniform attitude toward risk. Our results suggest that these correlation matrices should take into account the asymmetry in the correlations for the positive and negative returns and, therefore, are consistent with behavioral portfolio theory [36] that suggests different attitudes toward risk in different domains for the same investor.

Given the subtle nature of the correlations that we here are trying to detect, we will introduce an additional time average—now to be performed over the time scale $\Delta t$ that all previously introduced correlation functions depend. The averaged conditional market component correlation function is defined as

$$C(\rho, \Delta t) = \langle C(\rho, t, \Delta t) \rangle_{t=\Delta t \pm \Delta t}, \tag{8}$$

where $\Delta t_1$ and $\Delta t_2 > \Delta t_1$ are time scales over which stock-stock correlations are relevant (given the type of data being analyzed). The average over $\Delta t$ in Eq. (8) is performed only with the purpose of improving the statistics. For stock indices containing a large number of stocks (e.g., SP500 and NASDAQ), this average may not be needed. However, for the DJIA that currently contains only 30 stocks, this average is of advantage.

The needed formalism is by now introduced, and we are ready to use it for the empirical analysis. Here we are focusing on the DJIA, as mentioned previously, and the data to be analyzed were obtained from Yahoo Finance [37]. The data set consists of daily closing prices of the 30 DJIA stocks as well as the DJIA index itself. It covers an 18 years period from May 1991 to September 2008. Note that this period includes the development of the dot-com bubble in the late 1990s and its subsequent burst in 2000, the 1997 minicrash (as a consequence of the Asian financial crisis of 1997), the collapse of the Long-Term Capital Management (as a consequence of the Russian financial crisis of 1998), the early 2000s recession as well as the worldwide economic-financial crisis of 2007–2008.

With these data and the formalism presented previously, the averaged conditional market component correlation function, $C(\rho, \Delta t)$, can be calculated. It is presented in Fig. 3 for a range of positive and negative return levels, $\pm |\rho|$, where it has been assumed that $\Delta t=1 \text{ day}, \Delta t_1=10 \text{ day},$ and $\Delta t_2 =35 \text{ day}$. Figure 3 shows a pronounced asymmetry between positive and negative (index) return levels, $\pm |\rho|$. The stock-stock correlations, as given by $C(\rho, \Delta t)$, are systematically stronger whenever the market is dropping ($\rho<0$) than when it is rising ($\rho>0$). This is found to be the case for the whole range of considered levels of return $|\rho|$. It also worth noting that in the limit $|\rho| \rightarrow 0$ there is a substantial difference be-
obtained difference is a general feature of the stock market and is not due to one (or a few) special events where, e.g., the market crashes. To address these issues, additional analysis is required.

First, we revisited the averaging procedure over stock pairs used in defining Eq. (6). The aim was to show that the difference obtained in the measured correlations between the stocks for positive and negative levels of index returns was indeed present for the majority of the stock pairs. For this purpose, for each pair of stocks \((x, y)\) of the index, the average \(C_{(x,y)}(\rho, \Delta t) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} C_{(x,y)}(\rho, \Delta t_i)\), was considered, where the conditional stock-stock correlation function, \(C_{(x,y)}(\rho, \Delta t)\), is defined from \(S_{(x,y)}(t, \Delta t)\) in a completely analogous way to how \(C_0(\rho, \Delta t)\) was obtained from \(S(t, \Delta t)\) in Eq. (7b).

The distributions of the conditional stock-stock correlation function, \(C_{(x,y)}(\rho, \Delta t)\), including all possible stock pairs \((x \neq y)\) of the DJIA, is presented in Fig. 4 for some representative levels of index return \(|\rho| = 0.03, 0.05,\) and 0.10. The results of Fig. 4 indicate that the stock-stock correlations for a negative index return levels, \(-|\rho|\) (plotted as red shaded areas) is for the majority of the stock pairs stronger than the stock-stock correlations for the corresponding positive level (plotted as green dashed areas), and this observation applies equally for all the index return levels considered. An alternative way of illustrating this difference is to plot the distribution of the relative difference \(\chi_\rho = [C_{(x,y)}(\rho, \Delta t) - C_{(x,y)}(-|\rho|, \Delta t)]/C_{(x,y)}(|\rho|, \Delta t)\) [Fig. 5]. The clear asymmetry of this distribution with respective to \(\chi_\rho = 0\) is an indication that the stock-stock correlations for a negative index return level is in general stronger than the stock-stock correlations for the corresponding positive level (of the same magnitude).

The indications obtained from Figs. 4 and 5 that the conditional stock-stock correlations are stronger for negative than positive index return levels can also be confirmed more quantitatively by a statistical test. More precisely, we want to see what is the chance that two random samples from the same distribution would yield the observed difference in the mean. A Wilcoxon-type nonparametric \(z\)-test [38] was performed and the results of the test are presented in Table I. The negative value of \(z\) suggests that the stock-stock correlations for the negative change in the index are indeed bigger than those for the positive changes. The value of \(p\) is the probability that finite samples from the same ensemble

between the conditional market component correlation for the positive and negative returns: \(\lim_{|\rho| \to 0} [C_{(x,y)}(-|\rho|, \Delta t) - C_{(x,y)}(|\rho|, \Delta t)] = 0.07 \approx 7\%\). For the largest positive levels shown, it is noted that the statistical quality of the data is seen to become poor.

Hence, the empirical results of Fig. 3 support the primary assumption underlying the fear-factor model [23]; stocks are on average more strongly correlated (or synchronized) among themselves during falling than rising market conditions.

### IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS

The effect that we are studying here is rather subtle, and several averaging procedures had to be considered in order to identify it. Hence, it is important to have confidence in the results, and to make sure that they are not artifacts of the analyzing method. Moreover, one also has to prove that the

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**FIG. 3.** (Color online) The average conditional market component correlations, \(C(\rho, \Delta t)\), between the stock components for various return rates, \(\rho\), of the DJIA stock index. Open green triangles correspond to the positive return levels (\(\rho > 0\)), while filled red circles signifies negative return levels (\(\rho < 0\)). The stronger correlation in case of negative returns is readily observable from Fig. 3. In obtaining these results, it was assumed that \(\Delta t_1 = 10\) day, \(\Delta t_2 = 35\) day, and \(\Delta t = 1\) day. For values of \(|\rho|\) larger than about 0.15, the statistics became poor. This was in particular the case for positive values of \(\rho\).

**FIG. 4.** (Color online) The distribution, \(p(C_{(x,y)})\), of the correlation function \(C_{(x,y)}(\rho, \Delta t)\) based on all possible stock pairs \((x, y)\) within the DJIA stock index \((x \neq y)\). Red shaded areas correspond to \(\rho < 0\), while the areas green dashed areas refer to \(\rho > 0\). The distributions are given for various values of the return level \(\rho\) as indicated in each panel \((\Delta t = 1\) day in all cases).
would yield the hypothesized differences in the mean. The parameter $p$ is thus a measure of the significance level, smaller values correspond to higher significance for the obtained differences in the mean. The results presented in Table 1 show that the difference in conditional stock-stock correlations is indeed significant.

Second, we wanted to make sure that the observed asymmetry in $C_0(\rho, \delta_t, \Delta t) = \langle C(\rho, t, \delta_t, \Delta t) \rangle$ [Eq. (7)] was not caused by a few isolated events—like large market drops—but instead represented a feature of the market that was present at (more-or-less) all times. For this purpose, we went back and studied more carefully the time-dependent conditional market correlation function $C(\rho, t, \delta_t, \Delta t)$ (before the time average). More precisely, in order to improve the statistics, the following average was computed $\langle C(\rho, t, \delta_t, \Delta t) \rangle_{\delta_t = \delta_{t_1} = \delta_{t_2}} = C_1(\rho, \Delta t)$. For fixed values of the index return level $|\rho|$, and the time windows $\delta_{t_1} = 10$ days, $\delta_{t_2} = 35$ days, and $\Delta t = 1$ day, we compared the two distributions $p[C_1(\cdot | \rho|, \Delta t)]$ and $p[C_1(-| \rho |, \Delta t)]$. An asymmetry in $C_1(\rho, \delta_t, \Delta t)$ being caused by a few isolated events in $C_1(\rho, \Delta t)$, will produce almost identical distributions for the two cases $\pm |\rho|$ that only differ by some infrequent "outliers" that are large enough to move the mean. On the other hand, a more systematic difference in $C_1(\rho, \Delta t)$ for $+|\rho|$ and $-|\rho|$ will produce distinctly different distributions between the $p[C_1(\cdot | \rho|, \Delta t)]$ and $p[C_1(-| \rho |, \Delta t)]$ distributions.

In Fig. 6 we present the empirical distributions $p[C_1(\rho, \Delta t)]$ of the DJIA for some typical positive and negative values of the index return level. These empirical results point toward the two distributions $p[C_1(\cdot | \rho|, \Delta t)]$ and $p[C_1(-| \rho |, \Delta t)]$ being different. To quantitatively show that they differ significantly, again a nonparametric Wilcoxon significance test was performed. However, in order to conduct this test it is necessary to have the same number of data points in the histograms for positive and negative index return values. Since the $C_1(\rho, \Delta t)$-data did not have this property we had to ensure this condition. We first identified the set with the smallest number of elements (usually this was the set corresponding the negative returns), and then from the other set, the same number of elements were randomly selected. Here our assumption was that the random selection will not alter the normalized distribution. Results obtained by this procedure for the same values of $|\rho|$ used to produce Fig. 6 are given in Table II. The extremely small values obtained for $p$ suggest, as pointed out previously, that the difference between the two distributions, $p[C_1(\cdot | \rho|, \Delta t)]$ and $p[C_1(-| \rho |, \Delta t)]$, is indeed significant also for this averaging step.

Third, we address the level of conditional market correlation $C_0(\rho, \delta_t, \Delta t)$ as a function of the size of the time window $\delta_t$ for $\pm |\rho|$ (and $\Delta t = 1$ day) [Fig. 7]. Figure 7 shows that systematically, and independent of $\delta_t$ and $\rho$ (at least for the values we have considered), one finds that the conditional market correlations are higher for negative index return levels ($-|\rho|$) than the corresponding positive levels ($+|\rho|$); i.e., $C_0(-|\rho|, \delta_t, \Delta t) > C_0(+|\rho|, \delta_t, \Delta t)$. This suggests that the sign of the difference does not depend on the values of $\delta_t = 10$ day, $\delta_{t_2} = 35$ day, and $\Delta t = 1$ day.

FIG. 5. (Color online) The distribution of the quantity $X_p = \langle [C_{1/2}(\cdot | \rho|, \Delta t) - C_{1/2}(\cdot | \rho|, \Delta t)]\rangle/C_{1/2}(\cdot | \rho|, \Delta t)$ obtained on the basis of the DJIA stock index for different return levels, $\rho$, as indicated in the figures. We recall that in the case of no asymmetry, the distribution, $P(X_p)$, should be symmetric around $X_p = 0$ (vertical dashed lines).
considered for $\delta t_1$ and $\delta t_2$, used in performing the average over $\delta t$.

Finally, we investigate the time dependence of the difference between the market component correlation functions $S_0(t, \delta t, \Delta t)$ for positive and negative return levels. This will yield additional information on the observed asymmetry by visualizing the time periods that contribute with a significant difference to correlation calculations. For studying this effect for a fixed time window $\delta t$ we would, in principle, need a three-dimensional plot, presenting the value of $S_0(t, \delta t, \Delta t)$ as a function of $t$ and the value of the return $r_A(t)$. This three-dimensional plot, however, is very noisy; it is hard to interpret and also to visualize properly, so we consider instead a simpler two-dimensional representation. To this end, we first choose characteristic time-scales $\delta t$ and $\Delta t$, below to be set to $\delta t=20$ day and $\Delta t=1$ day (other choices would yield similar results). For these parameters one observes that $S_0(t, \delta t, \Delta t)$ is always positive. With this in mind we construct the following quantity:

$$F(t) = S_0(t, \delta t, \Delta t) \frac{r_B(t)}{|r_B(t)|},$$

where the factor $r_B/|r_B|$ has the effect of attributing a positive sign for the $S_0(t, \delta t, \Delta t)$ correlation in case of $r_B(t) > 0$ and a negative sign in case of $r_B(t) < 0$. By plotting $F(t)$ as a function of $t$ for the whole studied period we obtain the points plotted in Fig. 8(a). The results are not easily interpretable by a first look, since $F(t)$ has strong fluctuations and the positive and negative values have similar trend and quite close values. As a result a more delicate analysis (averaging) is needed, separating the positive and negative values.

simple average will not work since the number of positive and negative $F(t)$ values is different in any time window. This will bias the average and will not lead to interpretable results for the difference in the magnitude of the $S_0$ correlation for rising and falling market periods. We have thus for the positive and negative $F(t)$ values performed a separate average with a reasonably long moving time window ($T=200$ days). In this way we for each time moment define the following two quantities:

$$\langle F_+\rangle(t) = \langle F(t')\rangle_{F(t')\geq 0} |t'|=\ e^{-T/2, t+T/2} ,$$

and

$$\langle F_-\rangle(t) = \langle F(t')\rangle_{F(t')\leq 0} |t'|=\ e^{-T/2, t+T/2} .$$

The difference between them,

$$D(t) = \langle F_+\rangle(t) - \langle F_-\rangle(t),$$

gives relevant information on the difference in the magnitude of the correlations for rising and falling market on a time scale of $T=200$ days [Fig. 8(b)]. An inspection of Fig. 8(b) reveals that the leading trend is $D(t)<0$ for most periods.

This supports our main conjecture that, correlations between stock prizes are stronger whenever the market is falling than in case of rising market. However, Fig. 8(b) also shows that there are a few periods in the evolution of the market where the inverse is true. The conjectured results are true only in a statistical sense and seemingly it holds for the majority of the studied period. Analyzing the location of the deep minimums in Fig. 8(b) can also be interesting and opens perspectives for new studies. Changing the length of the time windows $\delta t$ and $T$ in a reasonable manner will not qualitatively affect these results.

| $|\rho|$ | $z$ | $p$ |
|---|---|---|
| 0.03 | -18.87 | $2.0 \times 10^{-79}$ |
| 0.05 | -18.16 | $9.1 \times 10^{-74}$ |
| 0.10 | -10.85 | $1.8 \times 10^{-27}$ |

| $|\rho|$ | $z$ | $p$ |
|---|---|---|
| 0.03 | -33.99 | $1.1 \times 10^{-79}$ |
| 0.05 | -16.62 | $4.3 \times 10^{-62}$ |
| 0.10 | -8.0 | $1.0 \times 10^{-16}$ |
V. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, we have conducted a set of statistical investigations on the DJIA and its constituting stocks, which confirm that during falling markets, the stock-stock correlations are stronger than during rising markets (gain-loss asymmetry phenomenon). This has been possible to measure empirically due to the design of a robust statistical measure—the conditional market correlation function \( C_0(\rho, \delta, \Delta t) \).

In particular, we have performed statistical tests that show that the observed asymmetry in the empirical conditional (market) correlation function is indeed significant, and not an artifact of the considered averaging procedure since it is clearly present in each averaging step. This empirical result gives confidence in the fear-factor hypothesis, which explains successfully the gain-loss asymmetry observed in the major stock indices.

From the perspective of finance, we note that a relatively small segment of the financial literature examines models which have the potential to describe, explain, and possibly forecast the phenomena which lead to stock market bubbles and their subsequent crashes [6]. The more technical and quantitative approaches either follow the general equilibrium models of macroeconomics [39] or the game-theoretical methodology [40].

The latter approaches try to model mathematically (many times using toy models) the interactions between agents and their expectations about each other’s behavior and the market average. Many times market microstructure plays a significant role in these models: the so-called frictions (the different taxes and transaction costs, liquidity constraints and other limits to arbitrage) are the factors that produce market crashes. The role of portfolio insurance (selling short the stock index futures [41]) in crashes is also strongly debated. However, the complex relationship between the microstructure factors, market sentiment, herding of investors and stock market crashes is still poorly understood.

In this perspective our results can have important consequences in theoretical and practical aspects of portfolio management and also in risk management of investment banks, investment funds, other financial institutions as well as regulators and decision makers concerned with the spillover of stock market crashes into the real economy. As was pointed out previously, the standard, mean-variance based portfolio theory views risks as symmetric measures (variance, covariance, etc.) assuming the stability of these risks as well as their symmetry in case of positive and negative returns.

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[37] The analyzed data are freely available from the Yahoo: http://finance.yahoo.com


